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COMMENTS
MISCONDUCT IN THE MARITAL RELATION:
ADULTERY AS A BAR TO DOWER
INTRODUCTION

In what is a case of first impression,' a Florida district court recently

held 2 that the Statute of Westminster was not a part of the law of Florida.

The statute3 enacted in 1285 stated that "If a uqfe willingly leave her husband and go away and continuc with her advouterer," (emphasis added) she
shall be barred of her dower4 unless her husband should afterward forgive
her and take her back. In other vords, the common law doctrine declared
that a wife would forfeit her dower if she voluntarily left her husband and

committed adultery.
It is the purpose of this article to discuss this ancient common law

statute and its subsequent treatment by the various states of the Union.
Because of the recent decision ' in Florida, particular emphasis will be given
to the status of the rule in this state.

The foundation of American jurisprudence is the English common law.0
It has been adopted generally throughout the United States with the exception of Louisiana, although some states have either modified, amended or
repealed it by statute or by constitutional provision.'

The common law

usually prevails as long as it is consistent with the Constitution and laws
of the United States and the constitution and laws of the particular state.
For example, the common law and certain statutes declared to be in force
in Florida are stated as follows:"

I. In Henderson v. Chaires, 25 Fla. 26, 6 So. 164 (1889), since adultery was
not proved, the court did not have to consider the applicability of the Statute of
Westminster.
2. Wax v. Wilson, 101 So.2d 54 (Fla. App. 1958).
3. 13 Edw. 1, c. 34 (1285).
4. MOYNIHAN, REAL PROPERTY, DOWER 27 (1940). At common law a widow
was entitled on the death of her husband, to a life estate in a third of the lands of
which her husband was seised in fee simple or in fee tail at any time during the
marriage. This life estate is called the widow's estate of dower.
5. See note 2 supra.
6. 11 Am. Juit. Common Law § 4 (1937).
7. Ibid.
8. Burlingame v. Traeger, 101 Cal. App. 365, 281 Pac. 1051 (1929); Matthews
v. McCain, 125 Fla. 840, 170 So. 323 (1926); Lutz v. State, 167 Md. 12, 172 Atl.
354 (1934); Nadstanek v. Trask, 130 Ore. 669, 281 Pac. 840 (1929).
9. FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1957). Comparable statutes to the same effect are:
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 28 § 1 (1957); N. C. GEN. STAT. ch. 4 § 4-1 (1953); PA.
STAT, ANN. Tit. 46 § 152 (1952).
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The common and statute laws of England which are of a general
and not a local nature, with the exception hereinafter mentioned,
down to the fourth day of July 1776, are declared to be of force in
this state; provided, the said statutes and common law be not
inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the United States
and the acts of the legislature of this state,
From the foregoing it follows that the states have adopted that part
of the common law which is not inconsistent with their positive law. It has
not been that simple, however. The Statute of \Vestminster has been
one of those "said statutes" which has caused considerable dispute as to
whether it is in force in the diffcrcnt states.
THi

REASONS FOR Tin

E'NACTMENT OF

THE STATUTE

OF WESTMINSTER

At common law, prior to the enactment of the statute, the commission
of adultery by a wife did not preclude her right of dower."' Even if a wife
abandoned her husband and committed adultery, such acts would not work
a forfeiture.'' At that time in history, neither adultery nor adultery coupled
with the act of abandonment were grounds for divorce.' 2 Under these circumstanccs, the husband did not have a remcdy if his mate committed such acts
of misconduct. iHe could not divorce her on the ground that she had engaged
in adultcTous relations with another man, and he was not able therefore to
defeat her right to dower. To correct this situation, the IEnglish Parliament
enacted the Statute of \Vcstiinster'" in 1285, which barred the wife's right
to dower where she voluntarily left her husband to live in adultery with
another man.
To exclude the wife from dower under the statute, it must be proved
that she, of her own free will, deserted her husband and lived in adultery,
and when asked to return to him thereafter, refused to return without a just
cause for such refusal. 4 Bricfly, there must be a voluntary separation by
the wife, as well as adultery, to make the bar completc " Such is clearly the

10. Co. LITT. 32, a (1953); 2 INsT. 435 (1797); Seagrave v. Seagrave, 13 Vesey
443, 33 Eng. Rep. 358 (1884); See also, Bryan v. Batcheller, 61 R. I. 543, 78 Am.
Dec. 454 (1860); Lakin v. Lakin, 84 Mass. 45, 2 Allen 45, (1861).
I1. AMERIcAN LAwV OF PROPERTY §§ 5.35, 5.38 (1952).
12. The English Divorce Act of 1857 recognized adultery as a ground for
divorce. Bisvo,, MARRIAGE AND DIVoRcE § 225 (6th ed. 1881); 1 BLACKSTONE,
COMMENrTARiMS 94 (1898).
13. See note 3 su ra.
14. Shaffer v. Richardson's Adm'r 27 Ind. 122 (1866); Cogswell v. Tibbetts,
3 N.I. 41 (1824); Reel v. Elder. 62 Pa. 308, (1869); Bell v. Nealy, I Bailey 312,
(S.C. 1829); llarman v. larman, 139 Va. 508, 124 S.E. 273 (1924) (The statute,
while somewhat different in phrascology than the Statute of \Westmiuster, had the same
meaning as tile English statute. The Virginia statute stated, "If a wife of her own free
will, leave her husband and live in adultery, she shall be barred of her dower, unless
her husband afterwards reconciled to her, and stiffer her to live with him").
15. Co. LITT. 32, b (1853); 2 INsT. 435-36 (1797).

COMMENTS
interpretation given to itby the majority of American courts,'" and the
leading English cases are to the same effect.' 7 The elopement need not
be with the adulterer, for even where there has been a voluntary separation
by mutual agreement the statute applies. 8 It is still necessary, however,
that she should have separated herself from her spouse willingly. For example,
in one case decided under a statute having the same meaning as the Statute

of Westminster, a wife was not held to be barred where she had lived in
adultery subsequent to her mate's desertion.'

In another case, in which the

English statute was held to be in force, the question was whether a woman
living in adultery at the time of her husband's death, without having left or
eloped with her adulterer, had forfeited her dower. It was held that she
21
had not.

It is important to note that the Statute of Vcstminster only refers to
dower and not to the interests of intestacy or homestead. However, there
are decisions which have expanded its scope to include these other rights.'
16. Wiseman v. Wiseman, 73 hnd. 112 (1880); Owen v. Owen, 57 Ind. 291
(1877); Goss v. Froman, 89 Ky. 318, 125 SAV. 387 (1910); Cogswell v. Tibbetts,
3 NI.L 41 (1824); Morello v. Cantalupo, 91 N.J.Eq. 415, 111 Atl. 255 (1920);
Adose v. Fossit. I Pearson 304 (Pa. 1867) (desertion and adultery on the part of the
wife barred tier from any right tinder the statute, since she was not a "member of the
family" at the time of the husband's death.); 1larman v. llarman, 139 Va. 508,
124 S.E. 273 (1924).
17. Bostock v. Smith, 34 Beav. 57, 55 Eng. Rep. 553 (1864) (The court
stated there would be no forfeiture tinder the statute, if the wife had not left her
husband's house "sponte sna", but had been compelled to take that step by the

cruelty and misconduct of her husband); ttetlrington v. Graham, 6 Bing. 135, 130
Eng. Rep. 1231 (1829) (dictum).

18. In tHthrington v. Graham, suopra note 17, the wife had left her husband
with his consent, and was living apart from him, with such consent, at the time
she committed adultery. Held, that if the wife leaves her husband voluntarily, and
afterwards lives in adultery, her dower is barred, though she does not elope with
the adulterer. The court said, "We hold the proper construction of the statute to
be what the words still will warrant, that if a wife leaves her husband with her own
free will, and afterwards lives in adultery, the dower is forfeited."
19. Gordon v. Dickinson, 131 Ill. 141, 23 N.E. 439 (1890). See also Beaty v.
Richardson, 56 S.C. 173, 34 S.E. 73 (1899)
20. In Cogswell v. Tibbetts, 3 N.1. 41 (1824), there was no allegation that the
wife left tier husband, and the court said, "however gross her conduct there may
have been, during the absence of her husband, itis very clear, itdoes not amount
to an elopement." By way of dicta, the court added the following remarks, "To work
the forfeiture, it is not necessary, that the wife should voluntarily leave the husband,
for if, after she has been taken away against her will, she consents to abide with the
adulterer, it will be deemed an elopement."
21. Cameto's Estate, Myrick Prob. Ct. Rep. 42 (Cal. 1873) (a wife who had
been unfaithful to her husband and at the time of his death was separated from him
and living in adultery was not entitled to have a homestead set apart for her); Coe v.
Nelson, 59 S.W. 170 (Teon. 1900) (by adultery the wife has forfeited allright
to any benefits in her husband's property); Prater v. Prater, 87 Tenn. 78, 9 S.V. 361
(1888). Contra, Duffy v. IHarris, 45 S.V. 545 (Ark. 1898) (abandonment and
adultery would not bar the widows' right to the homestead).
See also Turner
v. Cole, 24 Ala. 364 (1854) (adultery would bar the right to dower, but the
right to a distributive share was not an enlargement of the dower right and thus was
not subject to the same exceptions); Mack v. Pairo, 136 Md. 179, 110 Ati. 198
(1920) (adultery has no effect on the right of the erring husband to his distributive
share in the estate of his deceased wife); Lyons v. Lyons, 101 Mo. App. 494,

74 S.W. 467 (1903).

86

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol_ XIII

Another limitation on the application of the statute at common law was
that it only barrcd the wife from dower and its operation did not extend to
the husband's tight to curtesy. This interpretation has been generally followed, but in some instances the scope of the statute has been expanded
to include the husband. 2 Tie court in Mack v. Pairo23 indicated that the
statute is applicable to the husband, but held that it pertains only to real

estate.
In summation, the reason for the enactment of the Statute of \Vestminster is apparent -it gave the husband a remedy if his wife committed
adultery after deserting hiln. The remedy, though, was not relief in the

true sense of the word, since it came into being at the husband's death.
Undoubtedly, he could not enjoy the real effects of the statute at this time.
A more appropriate cure could have been the enactment of a divorce
statute.2 'I Historically speaking, England did not recognize divorce on the

grounds of adultery until a period subsequent to the enactment of the
Statute of Wcstniinstcr. 5' The results of this rule were negligible. For
cxamplc, whcrc a wife conmitted adultery but did not abandon her husband,
she would not be barred fron dower. Th only function of the doctrine
was to penalize the erring wife at her spouse's death.
DEVELOPMENNT OF T11E S'rA'ru'rE IN THE UNITED S'rlATES

Thei Maiority Rule.
The general pattern developed has bcen to accept the Statute of West-

minster either by adoption as part of the common law or by express legislative enactment. 6

In those states which have accepted the doctrine, there

has been a complete disparity as to its application; eg., some states construe
27
the statute literally, thus confining it only to the wife and her right of dower.
However, there have been acts which have explicitly provided that if either
the husband or wife voluntarily lcaves the other and commits adultery, le or
22. Stock v. Mitchell, 252 Ii. 530, 96 N.E. 1076 (1911) (The dower act
provides that if a husband or wife voluntarily leaves the other and commits adultery,
he or she shall be forever barred of dower, unless therc is a subsequent reconciliation).
Contra, Wells v. Thomp s on, 13 Ala, 793 (1848) (misconduct by the husband does
not work a forfeiture of his curtesy),
23. 136 Md. 179, 110 Atl. 198 (1920).
24. There can be situations where a husband has grounds for divorce because
of his wife's reprehensible conduct, but lie may not want to procure a divorce for
various reasons. His motives could be of a religious nature or they may be unknown.
For example, in one case where the husband had knowledge of his wife's misconduct,
but did not take advantage of the divorce statute, the court held that the wife would
not be barred of her dower. Schmcizl v. Schnseizl, 186 Md. 371, 46 A. 2d 619 (1946).
25. See note 12 supra.
26. See Annots., 71 A.L.R. 278 [1931), 139 A.L.R. 481 (1942).
27. Stegall v. Stegall, Fed. Cas. No. 13351 (C.C. Vt. 1825); Schmeizl v.
Schmeizi, 186 Md. 371, 46 A, 2d 619 (1946) (The statute only applies to dower);
Mack v. Pairo, 136 Md. 179, 110 AtI. 198 (1920) (dictum); Lyons v. Lyons, 101
Mo. App. 494, 745 S.W. 467 (1903) (adultery barred the wife from dower, but
not from the homestead).
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she shall be barred of dower . 5

rhen, there arc those jurisdictions which

utilize the principle depending upon equitablc principles to guide their
decisions.25 Gaylor v. Mcfenry"0 represents this approach. rhe rationale of
the court's decision was that the statute was passed to protect public morals,
and a "secret and single act" would not be likely to affect such morals.
The courts have applied the statute only when all its requirements have

been satisfied.3a There appear to be no reported cases involving the application
of the statute when one of its elements was lacking. The common trend has
been to employ the enactment in a reasonable fashion, and this spirit has
influenced many of the decisions. For cxample, in Beaty v. Richardson 2
the husband deserted his wife and resisted all her attempts to win him back.
After unsuccessful efforts to that end, she engaged in adultery. The statute
specified in plain, unmistakable language the acts which would operate as a
bar to the wife's claim of dower; viz. if she "willingly" left her husband
"and" continued with her adulterer. Since onc of the essential elements was
lacking, the wife not having left her husband "willingly," her dower
remained intact. This view is fully supported by other decisions.3
From
the cause
exception
continues

a reading of the cases it is clear, that where the husband has been
of his wife's adultery, she will not be barrcd from dower. An
occurs when the fugitive wife refuses an invitation to return and
her misconduct." Under the circumstances, the mere fact that

28. SITm-IluRa RE;v. STAT. ch. 41 § 15 (I11. 1929) provided that "if the husband
or wife voluntarily leave the other and commit adultery; lie or she shall be forever
barred of dower, unless they are afterwards reconciled and dwell together." See also, VA.
CoDE §§ 5123, 5140, 5277, 5786-5788 (1942) that provided "if either husband
or wife leaves the other and lives in adultery, he or she shall have no part of the
personal estate as to which the other consort dies intestate."
29. Zeigler v. Mize, 132 Ind. 403, 31 N.E. 945 (1892) (The wife was not
barred of dower, since at the time of her husband's death she was not living in
adultery. Several years before the husband's death the wife had committed adultery
and since the statute stated "shall be living at the time of his death in adultery", the
wife's dower remained intact); Landreth v. Casey, 340 Ill. 519, 173 N.E. 84 (1930)
(The husband had been living apart from his wife, but had his wife's consent to be
away. During his absence the husband had committed adultery, but since he had been
maintaining a fond relation with his wife, he was not barred from his curtesy);
Sergcnt v. North Cumberland Mfg. Co., 112 Ky. 888, 66 S.W. 1036 (1902) (Where
a wife continues to live with her husband even though she commits adultery, she will
not be barred of her dower).
30. 15 Ind. 383 (1860) (The holding of this case resulted primarily through
the argument of the wife's counsel).
31. Sergent v. North Cumberland Mfg. Co. 112 Ky, 888, 66 S.W. 1036 (1902)
fadulter, but no elopement). See also Cogswell v. Tibbetts, 3 N.tH. 41 (1824); Gordon
v. Dickinson, 131 Ill. 141, 23 N.E. 439 (1890) (The wife had engaged in adultery
subsequent to her mate's desertion and thus the element of elopement was lacking).
32. 56 S.C. 173, 34 S.E. 73 (1899).
33. Gordon v. Dickinson, 131 111.141, 23 N.E. 439 (1890); Zeigler v. Mize.
132 Ind. 403, 31 N.E. 945 (1892); Hoyt v. Davis, 21 Mo. App. 235 (1886); Bell v.
Nealy, 1 Bailey 312 (S.C. 1829) (dictum). Contra. Phillips v. Wiseman. 131 N.C.
402, 42 S.E. 861 (1902) (Even though the husband had committed misconduct, this
was no excuse for the wife to do the same. It was felt that the statute creating dower
rights "is framed for the benefit of the guiltless, not those in pari delicto.");
Bostock v. Smith, 34 Beav. 57, 55 Eng. Rep. 553 (1864).
34, Bell v. Nealy, supra note 33.
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the wife leaves home does not make the statute applicable. If the departure
is caused by the husband's behavior, be is guilty of constructive desertion.
Therefore, cven though the wife may engage in adultery, there has not been
a leaving "of her own free will" within the meaning of the statute. The
court in Estate of Mehaffey t5' stated, "But the 'fault', in order to furnish
justification for the separation - must be a serious one - deserting, m;iItrcating, or abusing her, driving her away, or inducing her to leave the home,
and the like," thus, limiting the wife's excuse for leaving her husband.
Another line of cases is that involving conrsensual separation and subsequent adultery. :" In this situation, the Statute of Westminster has not been
found applicable. Some states have statutes which declare that a wilful and
malicious desertion of the husband shall bar the wife of any interest in the
husband's estate.37 In order to satisfy the requirement of a willful and
malicious desertion, the courts havc held that the adultery gives rise to a
presumption of desertion, and such misbehavior is indicative of an intent to
desert. As already stated, the separation is consensual in its inception.
Later it becomes a desertion by the wife who engages in adultery.
A somewhat different typc of situation arises w'hen a husband condones
the immoral conduct of his truant spousc.t The question raised is whether
such condonation i)rcludes the operation of the English statute. Tle last
clause of the statute states, "she shall be barred of her dower unless hcr
husband should afterward forgive her anid take her back." The few reported
cases have involved intcstatc property rather than dower, and have inter
preted this section to the effect that condomtion "must be completcd and
accompanied by cohabitation."-"" Thus, the wife must return and resume
marital relations in order to participate in tle distribution of her husband's
estate. The rule seems quite harsh iiithat there are instances where a
husband would want to retain the marital ties but not want to resume
cohabitation with his runaway wife; e.g., because of family ties or religious
reasons. Under these circumstances, forgiveness in and of itself should be
sufficient, so as not to bar the wife of dower.
35. 102 Pa. 232, 156 At]. 746 (1931).
36. In re Bowman's Estate, 301 Pa. 337, 152 Atl. 38 (1930); In re Lodge's

Estate, 287 Pa. 184, 134 At]. 472 (1926); Clark v. Clement, 71 N.IL15, 51 Atl.

256 (1901)

(dictum). Contra, Jardine v. O'Hare, 66 Misc. 33, 122 N.Y. Supp. 463
courts held that a conviction for adultery is necessary

(Sup. Ct. 1910) (The New York

to preclude the wife from any interest).
37. For example, PA. STAT., 201 P. S. 1.2 (3), 1.6 (b) (1947) provides, "no
wife who shall have, for one year or upwards previous to the death of her husband,
wilfully and maliciously deserted her husband, shall have the right to claim any
title or interest in his real or personal estate after his decease, under the pr6visions
of this act."
38. Schmeizl v, Schmneiz], 186 Md. 371, 46 A. 2d 619 (1946); In re Fenyo's
Estate, 105 Pa. Super. 560, 161 Atl. 606 (1932); In re Drinlchouse's Estate (Orph.

Ct.) 11 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 96, 29 Wkly. Notes Cas. 35 (1890).
39. See in re leuyo's Estate, VP ra note 38; accord, In re I)rinkhouse's Estate
supra note 38. But c. Schneizl v. Schmeizl sura note 38 (The husband had
knowledge of his wife's misconduct, but he did not procure a divorce. The wife
was not barred from dower).

1958]

COMMENTS
The Minority View - The Florida Position

There have been many inroads made ol the majority view," the most
current one being the Florida decision." The court declared that the Statute
of Westminster has been "impliedly repealed" by section 65.04 of the
Florida Statutes which makes adultery grounds for divorce. That same type
of reasoning has been applied by other state courts in several cases. 42 The
ratioiale of these dccisions is that the law gives the husband a remedy and
it is optional with him to use it or not. Even though a husband for religious
or other rcasons may not desire to avail himself of the relief given to him by
the divorce laws, such motives do not justify the abrogation of the wife's
right of dower by the usc of tile ancient rule. Thus, where the states have
given adequate and broader remedies than that afforded by the English
statute, such remedies are exclusive. 43 Lakin v. Lakin 44 upheld this view. The
court, in refusing to apply the English statute, reasoned that the divorce
statute is "preferable to the provisions of the English law."
Still another factor to be clarified is the current status of section 2.01
of the Florida Statutes. That section adopted the common law of England
which was in force as of July 4, 1776, and which was not "inconsistent" with
the laws of Florida. The court hcld in Wax v. Wilson -" that the Statute
of Westminster was "inconsistent" with the laws of Florida. What formula
was employed to achieve this holding? The reasoning behind the decision
seems to parallel that of another Florida opinioin/ 6 '1'lie court tHeMe used
expressions as "the common law yields to the implied meaning of a statute,
as well as its expressed provisions, general and comprehensive statutes that
are designed to regulate an entire subject supersede all common law rules in
the premises, and the valid provisions of the statute are the controlling

40. Nolan v. Doss, 133 Ala. 259, 3t So. 969 (1902) (no statutor' provision
referring to wife's misconduct); Littlefield v. Paul, 69 Mc. 527 (1879) (Statute of
Westminster was not a part of the common law and there was no statutory
provision declaring adultery as a bar to dower); Lakin v. Lakin, 84 Mass. Rep.
45 (1861) (The divorce laws have replaced the need for the Statute of Westminster); Lecompte v. Washington, 9 Mo. 551 (1846) (The divorce and dower laws
are adequate); Application of Schinzing's Estate, 2 Misc. 2d 661, 150 N.Y.S. 2d
305 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Bryan v. Batchehler, 6 R.I. 543 (1860); Davis v. Davis'
Ex'r, 167 \Wisc. 328, 167 N.\V. 819 (1918).
41. Wax v. Wilson, 101 So.2d 54 (Fla. App. 1958).
42. Lakin v. Lakin, Lecompte v. Washington, Davis v. Davis' Ex'r, sura note 40.
43. Such reasoning was used in the recent Florida holding when the court said.
"It is apparent that the legislation of this state has covered all the respective rights
involved in the Statute of \vestminster II. The Statute is inconsistent with the
present laws of marriage and divorce as our legislature has recognized it. It is therefore
not in force in this state."
44. 84 Mass. 45 (1861).
45. Wax v. Wilson, 101 So.2d 54 (Fla, App. 1958).
46. Broward v. Broward, 96 Fla. 131, 117 So. 691 (1928). See also, Randolph
v. Randolph, 146 Fla. 491, 1 So.2d 480 (1941) ("Where the reason for any rule
of law ceases, the rule should be discarded").
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law .... " Similar expressions have been found in other cases.47 Another
source48 has indicated that common law rules should be recognized only
when they meet conditions existing in the state. Hence, such rules will
control, if the conditions they are to apply to are ones which had been
contemnplatcd by the common law. As stated previously, the motives behind
the enactment of the English statute were clear. '[he principal object of the
statute was to give the husband some "comfort" when his runaway wife
comnittcd adnltery. The majority opinion ill the Florida case49 recognized
that such motives did not coincide with the conditions presently existing in
the state. Since adultery is a ground for divorce,"" the court felt itself bound
by the divorce statute.
The view taken by the unsuccessful litigants has much support.,, It was
urged that this common law principle becanie a part of the law of Florida
by virtue of section 2.01 Florida Statutes. Because the statutory law was
52
silent on this question it was argued that the common law governs
CONCLUSION

In making any decision as to the applicability of a common law statute,
the Florida courts must look to the provisions of section 2.01 of the Florida
Statutes. The purpose of this section is to assimilate the English common
law which is not inconsistent with the statutory laws of Florida. \Vhen the
court takes ip the question of dctrmining whether a common law statute
is in force, one difficult-' - the primary difficulty, is the lack of a realistic,
com1mon sense meaning of the word "inconsistcnt." It can be logically
argued that the legislature intended to reject that part of the common law
which conflicted with the statutory law of Florida, and it is certainly not
unreasonable to presumc that the intent was to accept the common law which
was merely supplemntaty to its positive law. Thc holding in XVax v. XVilson, 5
that the divorce act "implicdly repealed" the Statute of Westminster
seems unrealistic in view of the fact that the acts were enacted for different
purposes. The English act was a sanctionary measure, penalizing the wife at
her husband's death. On the other hand, the divorce statute is remedial,
in that it is designed to give relief to a wronged spouse. Another distinction
47. Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So.2d 420 (1ia. 1952); Gilchrist v. Filyau, 2 Fla. 94,
97 (1848). Contra, Sullivan v. Leatherman, 48 So.2d 836 (Fla. 1950) ("An act
which is supplementary to the common law does not displace it any further than
is clearly necessary"); Banficid v. Addington, 104 Via. 661, 140 So. 893 (1932)
(dictum). See also, Strauss v. Strauss, 148 Fla. 23, 3 So2d 727 (1941) (Mentioning
the influence of Christian ethics).
48. 11 Am. Jfo. Common Law § 6 (1937).
49. Wax v. Wilson, 101 So.2d 54 (Fla. App. 1958).
50. FLA. STAT. § 65.04 (1957).
51. See cases cited note 27 vupra.
52. See for example, Re Chesser, 93 Fla. 590, 112 So. 87 (1927); Peters v.
Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 103 Pac. 219; Sesler v. Montgomery, 78 Cal. 486, 21 Pac. 185
Rl8~See note 49 supra.
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is that under the common law "act," the wife at the death of her husband was
deprived of dower by reason of her own action, whereas the divorce statute
requires affirmative action during the lifetime of either spouse to preclude
the other from dower.
It appears from an examination of the cases that there is nothing in
the divorce statute inconsistent with the Statute of Westminster, or which
evinces a purpose to cover the entire subject of what will bar the right to a
spouse's estate. It is difficult to see how the giving of an additional remedy,
such as the divorce statute, Would abrogate the comnon law statute, and
for this reason the writer bclievcs that the Florida court could have found
better justification for its decision.
In addition, it is not entirely clear whether the acceptance of the Statute
of Westminster would clear up every problem that might arise. For example,
if the Florida court would have held that the Statute of \Vcstmiistcr was
in force, the wife would have been barred from dower. But what effect
would this have had on her intestate rights? Assuming that the husband's
estate was secure from creditors, the wife by being barred from dower still
could have elected to take her intestate share, which in a given situation may
be more than dower. Neither the common law nor the statutory law of
Florida makes any provision concerning forfeiture of a widow's intestate interest on the grounds of adultcry.' The injustice of allowing an adulterous
wife or husband to share in his spouse's estate is apparent. The situation
calls for a legislative enactment which would bar an erring husband or wife
from all interest in his mate's estate. This suggestion may seem severe, but
such statutes do exist in other jurisdictions. ' '
HAROLD A. TURTLETAUB
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CODE §§ 64-19, 64-35 (1950);

